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Abstract
The aim of the present study was to test the cognitive ethology approach, which seeks to link cognitions and behaviours as
they operate in everyday life with those studied in controlled lab-based investigations. Our test bed was the understanding
of first-person and third-person perspectives, which in lab-based investigations have been defined in a diverse and multi-
faceted manner. We hypothesized that because these lab-based investigations seek to connect with how first- and third-
person perspective operates in everyday life, then either some of the divergent lab-based definitions are missing their mark
or the everyday conceptualization of first- and third-person perspective is multi-faceted. Our investigation revealed the
latter. By applying a cognitive ethology approach we were able to determine that a) peoples’ everyday understanding of
perspective is diverse yet reliable, and b) a lab-based investigation that applies these diverse understandings in a controlled
setting can accurately predict how people will perform. These findings provide a ‘proof of concept’ for the cognitive
ethology approach. Moreover, the present data demonstrate that previous lab-based studies, that often had very different
understandings of first- and third-person perspective, were each in and of themselves valid. That is, each is capturing part of
a broader understanding of perspective in everyday life. Our results also revealed a novel social factor not included in
traditional conceptualizations of first-person third-perspective, that of eye gaze, i.e., eye contact is equated strongly with
first-person perspective and the lack of eye-contact with third-person perspective.
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Introduction
For decades experimental psychology in general, and cognitive
psychology in particular, has benefited from the rigorous
application of a scientific research approach based on simplifying
and controlling the experimental situation in order to discover causal
relationships between factors, such as the relation between levels of
stimulus processing and memory for those processed items [1] or
attentional selection and visual masking as evidenced in the
‘‘attentional blink’’ phenomenon [2]. Though this methodological
approach has been extremely successful in generating reliable
effects within a laboratory setting, it has also exposed profound
limitations. While the intent was that an empirical foundation
would be created that enabled researchers to develop cognitive
constructs and theories that were universally valid, the reality is
that usually the relationship between two factors is reliable if, and
only if, particular environmental contexts and controls are present.
Change the context or remove the controls and the relationship
between factors becomes unpredictable. For example, what people
remember depends not just on the level that a stimulus is processed
but on whether the environment during encoding is the same as
during recall (e.g., [3]). In a similar vein, what is visually selected
or masked does not depend merely on the stimuli that are
presented but on what items are expected to be seen (e.g., [4]).
The fact that cognitive processes change with the situational
context in which a subject is embedded presents a serious
challenge to researchers. Many have chosen to redefine the scope
of their research objectives to understanding how a particular
phenomenon, such as inhibition of return, behaves only in a
laboratory setting [5], whereas some have emphasized the
importance of investigating behaviour that emerges within more
natural contexts, typically involving a complex analysis of
coordinated sequences of actions [6–10].
In addition to these approaches, others have begun to embrace
the fact that cognition varies with situational context and have
turned it into the very focus of their laboratory enterprise, as is the
case with embodied and distributed cognition [11–15]. An early
response to this context-based challenge, exemplified by the
celebrated cognitive scientists Donald Broadbent and Ulric
Neisser, has been to work tirelessly to make scientist aware that
their work risks having little relevance to real life if their effects are
constrained to changes that occur within the laboratory [16] [17].
Broadbent and Neisser’s challenge is for researchers to discover a
way to establish a valid empirical link between the work that they
do in the lab to everyday phenomena.
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In response to the call of Broadbent and Neisser, a research
approach called Cognitive Ethology was advanced by Kingstone,
Smilek, and colleagues [18–21]. Although the cognitive ethology
approach shares elements with other studies that emphasize the
need to understand behaviour from within more natural contexts
[6], [8] the aim was to provide the research scientist with a
methodology for bridging the gap that exists between uncontrolled
real-life phenomena and controlled laboratory investigation, so
that the effect studied in the lab can make direct and relevant
contact with everyday life. In a nutshell, cognitive ethology
proposes that one should ideally study a phenomenon first as it
naturally occurs within a complex real-world environment before
trying to move its investigation into more simplified and controlled
lab-based situations. By starting at the natural level, one’s
subsequent investigations are grounded in cognition and perfor-
mance as it occurs in real life, and hence, through comparison
between life and lab, one can determine which lab-based findings
are likely to scale up to a natural environment and which findings
are specific to a controlled research environment.
In the past few years, a great deal of published work has
confirmed cognitive ethology’s underlying assumption that the
way people behave in natural situations, and the conclusions that
one draws from that behaviour, are often very different from the
behaviour and conclusions generated in the lab. For example, lab-
based research has demonstrated that when people are presented
with images containing people, their attention is drawn automat-
ically toward their faces and eyes [22–25]. Yet, recent investiga-
tions have demonstrated that this effect is often reversed in a
natural social situation, such that people avoid looking at other
people in the face and eyes when there is a potential for social
interaction [26–29]. For example, Foulsham et al. [26] showed
that when participants are simply asked to walk across campus, as
they approach other people they avoid looking at their faces and
eyes.
While recent real-world investigations have been effective at
confirming that there is often a disconnection between life and lab,
the goal of cognitive ethology is to bridge this gap. To date,
however, there has not been a single study that has set out to apply
systematically a cognitive ethological approach to determine if its
prescribed methodology will yield data that spans the gap between
life and lab.
The aim of the present investigation was to provide precisely
such a test. Our first challenge was to decide on what real world
phenomenon we should investigate. The idea for a research topic
was decided when we referred back to the original cognitive
ethology article of Kingstone et al. [19]. This article suggests the
following guiding research principles. First, the initial job of the
researcher is to observe and describe what people do in the real
world in order to specify the domain of inquiry. Such observation
should be undertaken in a systematic empirical manner, providing
a description of cognition as it operates in real-world settings.
Second, the conceptual language used to describe human
cognition should, initially, be grounded in the concepts and
language that are used by people in their everyday life. Third,
studies of human cognition should integrate measures of both
objective (third-person) behaviour as well as subjective (first-
person) experiences. First-person subjective reports should be
combined in a mutually constraining fashion with third-person
objective observations of behaviour. It was this final point that
suggested to us that an excellent place to start was with the
question of how first- and third-person perspectives are represent-
ed in real life and in the laboratory.
Conceptualizing Perspectives
We experience our world from an egocentric (i.e. first-person)
perspective and only later develop an ability to understand
experiences from the perspective of others (i.e. third-person).
Although we exhibit an egocentric bias that persists into adulthood
[30], early work in this area has suggested that the ability to infer
Table 1. Coding Scheme Categories Developed From Subjective Reports.
Category Possible Value Representative Subjective Report
Distance Near ‘‘Close up, detail’’
Middle ‘‘What I saw whilst walking around’’
Far ‘‘Pictures taken from further away’’
Angle Tilt up ‘‘Pictures that make me feel like
I am looking up’’
Eye Level ‘‘Pictures taken at eye-level’’
Tilt Down ‘‘Shots looking down’’
Content No people ‘‘Absence of people’’
Portrait of face ‘‘Somebody directly looking at me and smiling’’
Portrait with body ‘‘A picture of someone else engaged in their
own activity that I am not part of’’
Body part ‘‘Looking at my body’’
Subject Self ‘‘Pictures of me doing something’’
Other ‘‘Other people doing things, not me’’
No People ‘‘No people, just an object’’
Eye Gaze Toward Camera ‘‘The more likely there is eye contact,
the more likely it is 1st person’’
Away ‘‘Lack of attention to camera’’
Hidden ‘‘Picture of my own body’’
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092696.t001
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the perceptual experiences or cognitive state of others develops
around the age of 7 [31]. However, others have suggested that
non-egocentric perspective-taking can emerge as early as 3–5 years
of age [32–34]. This ability to distinguish one’s own experiences
from the experiences of others is thought to be crucial for the
development of self-consciousness (e.g., distinguishing between self
experience and others’ experience) and theory of mind (e.g.,
learning to infer the internal states of others; [35], [36]). Thus,
from a relatively young age, distinct representations of first- and
third-person perspective appear to emerge. This notion of distinct
representations has also been supported by recent neuroimaging
evidence. Specifically, adopting either a first- or third-person
perspective has been associated with distinct patterns of neural
activity [37], [38].
In addition to the interest the concepts of first-person and third-
person perspectives have received in the developmental literature,
these concepts have also long been employed in studies aimed at
furthering our understanding of various aspects of cognition.
However, perhaps due to the subjective nature inherent in the
notion of first- and third-person perspectives, the issue that arises is
that stimuli and task instructions intended to induce perspective-
taking have differed substantially between subfields of cognitive
psychology. For example, since the seminal work of Nigro and
Neisser [39], memory research on perspective has focused on how
people view themselves within a recalled scene. McIsaac and Eich
[40] have developed a methodology in which participants are
instructed to form a mental image of a scene as if seeing it again
through their own eyes (first-person field perspective) or as if seeing
themselves within the remembered scene, from an external
viewpoint of a detached observer (third-person observer perspec-
tive). Notably, these instructions, in addition to manipulating
viewpoint, emphasize the presence of one’s entire body in the
recalled scene, as well as a generalized detachment from the events
portrayed.
Neuroimaging studies have proposed different conceptualiza-
tions of first- and third-person perspective-taking. For example,
Ruby and Decety [41], focusing on motor imagery, presented
participants with photographs of familiar objects (as well as
auditory sentences describing familiar actions) and instructed them
to imagine acting with the object themselves (first-person) or to
imagine the experimenter acting with the object (third-person).
Unlike the memory investigations, which emphasized different
viewpoints by the participant, Ruby and Decety’s version of third-
person perspective has participants picturing someone else in the
imagined scene, rather than themselves. Thus, the emphasis for
this conceptualization of perspective is not viewpoint but the
distinction between self and other in terms of physical agency.
Vogeley and colleagues [42], [43] also investigated the neural
correlates of perspective, utilizing a somewhat more abstract
perspective-taking task in which participants were shown a virtual
scene consisting of a human-like avatar surrounded by a number
of red orbs. In contrast to the person-focused tasks of McIsaac and
Eich [40] or Ruby and Decety [41], this task required participants
to consider the number of orbs visible from their own perspective
(first-person) or from the avatar’s perspective (third-person). Thus,
in contrast to an emphasis on viewpoint or agency, the defining
feature of third-person perspective in studies such as Vogeley
et al.’s is the act of centering multidimensional space on another
being.
Recent work has also employed perspective manipulations to
understand behaviour that emerges during action observation. For
example, Flanagan and Johansson [44] demonstrated that eye
movement patterns are similar when performing a block-stacking
task (first-person) and when observing the same task being
completed by another individual (third-person). Jackson, Meltzoff,
and Decety [45] also demonstrated that imitation is facilitated
when observing videos taken from ones own perspective (i.e.,
head-centered, first-person perspective) compared to watching
videos of other people. This work presents two additional
conceptualizations of first- vs. third-person perspective, the first
comparing performing actions vs. observing another’s actions and,
the second, comparing the observation of head-centered videos vs.
videos of another completing an action. Interestingly, a compar-
ison of performing an action and observing head-centered videos,
two conceptualizations of a first-person perspective, also revealed
differences in eye movement behaviour and memory performance
[46]. Specifically, participants prioritized the selection and
subsequent identification of task relevant objects to a greater
degree when actually performing the task compared to passively
viewing head-centered videos of the task being completed.
The Problem
While behavioural and neurophysiological investigations di-
verge in their conceptualization of first- and third-person
perspectives, they share a common goal of linking their findings
and conceptualization of perspective to how perspective is used in
one’s everyday life. For example, McIsaac and Eich [40],
introduce the concept of perspective taking by discussing the
perspectives people typically assume when recalling various life
events, such as their wedding day or what they ate for breakfast
that morning. Similarly, despite having participants situated in an
fMRI scanner, Ruby and Decety [41] state that their use of
auditory stimuli provides an ecologically valid context for
investigating differences in first- and third-person perspectives,
and Vogeley et al. [43] state that their avatar task taps into
perspective as an essential aspect of self-consciousness providing
insight into one’s understanding of the relationship between an
individual and the objects in the environments. Finally, a clear link
to more natural contexts has also been provided by Flanagan and
Johansson [44] and Tatler et al. [46] as the first-person perspective
conditions employed in their work involved having participants
actually perform an everyday task.
Given the multi-faceted lab-based operational definitions of
perspective it is reasonable to hypothesize that either some of the
lab studies are applying definitions that are not representative of
perspective taking in everyday life or conceptualizations of first-
and third-person perspectives in everyday life are multi-faceted.
An extreme position would be to ask if the third-person perspective
is even a meaningful concept in natural terms? If it is not then
asking people to conceptualize first- vs. third- person perspectives
might be a rather difficult and unnatural task for people to do. In
other words, it is unclear whether first- vs. third-person can be
represented or captured within an uncontrolled complex situation.
Such an outcome would have drastic implications for the
Figure 1. Figure 1A presents the Perspective6Viewing Distance interaction for pictures without people. Participants tended to take
more close (,1 m) pictures to capture first-person perspective and more far (.10 m) pictures to capture third-person perspective. Figure 1B
provides examples of pictures showing the critical factor of distance in pictures without people. Top: First-person, both pictures
demonstrate the tendency to take pictures within personal space. Bottom: Third-person, both pictures show subjects representing third-person
perspective through distance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092696.g001
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ecological validity of the lab-based investigations that employ
various conceptualizations of first- and third-person perspectives.
Addressing this issue thus seems to be an ideal test case for the
cognitive ethology approach.
Present Investigation
According to the prescribed methodology of the cognitive
ethology approach, the goal is to first observe and collect data
(both objective behavior and subjective reports) from uncontrolled
everyday contexts. This then allows for the generation of
hypotheses that can be tested subsequently in the lab. In order
to apply this approach to understand how participants’ concep-
tualize first- and third-person perspectives within their everyday
environment, two stages of investigation were required. First,
participants were instructed to explore a natural environment and
take photographs of scenes that represented their individual
interpretation of first- and third-person perspectives. Subjective
reports were also collected to combine with the picture-taking task
in an attempt to identify key factors in how individuals
conceptualize the different perspectives. The purpose of the
second stage of the investigation was to assess whether partici-
pants’ everyday understanding of first- and third-person perspec-
tive generalizes to a lab-based context. To this end, we tested
whether the factors identified as important to the understanding of
first- and third-person perspectives from the picture-taking task
and subjective reports could be used to accurately predict
performance in a controlled picture-sorting task. An independent
group of participants completed a task where they were instructed
to rank order, in the laboratory, a set of images as most-to-least
representative of first- or third-person perspective. In short, by
grounding the understanding of perspective in the data acquired
from a more natural everyday context (Stage 1), a predictive model
of participant performance was generated and compared to the
participants’ actual performance on the task (Stage 2). It is
important to note here that cognitive ethology does not purport to
be able to capture in a single study all aspects of human cognition
and behaviour that one is interested in understanding, i.e., in the
present case first- and third-person perspective. The cognitive
ethology approach seeks to acquire an accurate representation of
freely occurring natural behaviour and to use that to understand
and predict human cognition and behaviour as it occurs within
complex real-world situations. Thus by asking participants to take
photographs depicting their understanding of first- and third-
person perspective, whatever that understanding may be, we are
not expecting to capture all factors that affect first- and third-
person perspective as it naturally occurs. For example, there may
be key features (e.g., action, sound, motion, touch, smell, sound,
cross-cultural differences) that are not easily represented by a
photograph. The key point is that there is a critical distinction to
be drawn between the method of cognitive ethology – and its
Figure 2. Figure 2A presents the Perspective 6 Subject
interaction for pictures with people. Participants took significantly
more pictures of themselves (self) in first-person than in third-person.
Conversely, subjects usually represented third-person by taking pictures
of other people. Figure 2B presents the Perspective 6 Eye
direction interaction for pictures with people. First-person
perspective was captured by participants by taking pictures either of
their own body, or another person who was looking at the camera.
Third-person perspective was represented predominantly by taking of
pictures of other people who were not looking at the camera.
Figure 2C provides examples of photos showing the Perspec-
tive 6 Subject and Perspective 6 Eye Direction factors in
pictures with people. Top left: First-person, picture of someone else,
looking at camera. Top right: First-person, participanths picture of their
own body performing an action. Bottom left and right: Third-person,
pictures of other people not looking at camera. Individuals depicted in
Figure 2C have given written informed consent (as outlined in PLOS
consent form) to publish these case details.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092696.g002
Cognitive Ethology and Perspective
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Figure 3. Predicted picture rank based on experimenter scoring scheme compared to average subject rank for each picture in the
picture ordering task. (A) Predicted vs. observed for 1PP. (B) Predicted vs. observed for 3PP.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0092696.g003
Cognitive Ethology and Perspective
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emphasis on reducing experimental control and increasing
situational complexity – and the measurement of that behaviour
that is used and the necessary limitations that this can entail.
Methods
Ethics Statement
The present investigation was conducted in accordance with
American Psychological Association standards for ethical treat-
ment of subjects and received ethical approval through the
University of British Columbia’s Behavioural Research Ethics
Board.
Participants
Sixteen undergraduate students (nine female; ages 18–25 years)
were recruited at the University of British Columbia and
completed the picture-taking task. An additional eight participants
were recruited (4 females, ages 22–60 years) to complete the
subsequent picture-sorting task. All participants provided written
informed consent and reported normal or corrected-to-normal
vision.
Procedure
Stage 1 – Collecting natural behavior in picture-taking
task. Upon entering the laboratory, the experimenter and
participant engaged in a verbal dialogue regarding the partici-
pant’s understanding of the concept of perspective. Importantly,
throughout this discussion, the experimenter did not provide a
definition of perspective to the participants, thus avoiding any
potential bias in how the participants themselves conceptualize
first- and third-person perspectives. Once the participant stated
that they felt able to complete the picture-taking task, they were
loaned a digital camera (Canon Powershot A60) and instructed to
take pictures that best represented their understanding of first- or
third-person perspective, with the order of perspective counter-
balanced across participants. Participants were told that they were
free to take as many pictures as they wished from anywhere inside
or outside the department of Psychology at the University of
British Columbia. Participants were also instructed not to delete
any pictures and to return in approximately 10–15 minutes.
Following each picture-taking task, participants were asked a
series of questions to gain insight into what key factors they
associated with each viewing perspective. Specifically, participants
were asked the following three questions: Why did you take the
pictures you did? What elements of your picture did you feel
needed to be there to best demonstrate what first (or third) person
perspective means to you? What picture, of all the pictures you
took, do you feel best captures the definition of first (or third)
person perspective, and why?
Stage 2 – Using everyday behaviour to make predictions
in a lab-based picture-sorting task. Participants were pre-
sented with 14 photographs and were instructed to order the
pictures based on their individual understanding of first- and third-
person perspectives. Participants performed the task twice, once
arranging the images based on their understanding of first person
perspective and again based on their understanding of third person
perspective. The order of perspective was counterbalanced across
participants.
To control for the possible influence of image valence, the
images selected for participants to order were taken from the
International Affect Picture System (IAPS). All selected images
were ranked as pleasant (ranging in affect from 2.06 to 7.57, with
higher values representing more pleasant valence; [47]). Images
were also as diverse as possible yet shared similar features and
content as the images taken by participants in Experiment 1. For
example, some pictures contained people while others were of
natural scenes. Pictures containing people encompassed a range of
scenarios, with people performing different activities such as
standing by a gravestone or playing chess. Some individuals in the
pictures also appeared to make eye contact with the camera, while
others did not.
The pictures were presented on a computer screen in thumbnail
version, measuring 2.2–2.962.8–3.0 cm. Each individual picture
could be expanded by double-clicking on the thumbnail, with
enlarged pictures measuring 20.8–21.1625.0–30.7 cm. Partici-
pants were asked to arrange the pictures left-to-right by dragging
and dropping the thumbnail versions of the pictures on the screen
with the mouse so that the most representative picture of a given
perspective was located in the top left-hand corner of the screen.
Results
Picture-taking Task
A total of 274 pictures were taken by participants. Each image
was coded based on a categorical scheme derived from the
participants’ subjective reports, describing the factors they felt
were the most associated with the two perspectives. Specifically,
from over 250 collected subjective responses, 27 relatively specific
sub-categories were generated (e.g., reports mentioning a ‘‘top
down angle’’ were one sub-category). We then grouped these sub-
categories into broader categories, each possessing a number of
levels. For example, the ‘‘top down angle’’ sub-category was
grouped together with three other sub-categories for form the
broad ‘‘Viewing Angle’’ factor (see Table 1). This process yielded
the following five factors that were critical in distinguishing
between perspective conditions and were remarkably consistent
across participants, 1) Viewing distance (Near/Middle/Far) 2)
Viewing angle (Up/Level/Down) 3) Content (No People/Portrait
of face/Portrait with body/Body part) 4) Subject (Self/Other) and
5) Eye direction (Toward camera/Away/Hidden). Each image
was categorized across these factors to allow for a comparison of
the factors thought to be critical for each perspective. Coding
accuracy was validated by an independent researcher not involved
in the present study, with two coders agreeing on 96% of the
categorizations. A hierarchical log linear analysis (SPSS analysis
hiloglinear; SPSS 2010) was conducted combining perspective
(first2/third-person) with the 5 factors derived from the subjective
reports. Interestingly, an initial sweep of the categorical data
revealed that the presence or absence of people in the photos was a
factor in all significant interactions. In light of this finding, we
formed two broad image categories to compare across partici-
pants’ representations of first- and third-person perspectives –
pictures that did not contain people (160 pictures, 100 first-person
and 60 third-person) and pictures that did contain people (114
pictures, 58 first-person and 56 third-person).
Pictures without people. Data for pictures without people
were analyzed using a hierarchical log linear analysis ( [48]; SPSS
procedure HILOGLINEAR, 2010) with 3 factors, Perspective,
Viewing Distance and Viewing Angle. A backward elimination
procedure yielded a final model with components Viewing Angle
and Perspective6Viewing Distance, i.e., the data are completely
accounted for by these two components. The interaction
Perspective 6 Viewing Distance (x2(2,N= 160) = 13.1, p,0.01) is
illustrated in Figure 1a and reflects the fact that, to depict a first-
person perspective, participants tended to take pictures of objects
from a close range (,1 m; 49%) rather than a mid-range (1–10 m;
36%) or a far range (.10 m; 15%). In contrast, to depict a third-
person perspective participants tended to take fewer pictures from
Cognitive Ethology and Perspective
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close range (25%), favoring pictures from mid- and far-ranges
(38%, and 37%, respectively). Examples of these photos are shown
in Figure 1b. No other effects were significant.
Pictures with people. Data for pictures with people were
analyzed using a hierarchical log linear analysis with 6 factors -
Perspective, Viewing Distance, Viewing Angle, Content, Subject,
and Eye Direction. A backward elimination procedure yielded a
final model with components Content6Viewing Angle, Content
6 Eye Direction, Viewing Distance 6 Eye Direction, Viewing
Distance6Viewing Angle, Subject6Viewing Distance, Content
6 Viewing Distance, Perspective 6 Subject, Perspective 6 Eye
Direction, and Subject6Eye Direction. In other words, the data
are completely accounted for by these six 2-way interactions, and
no higher-order interactions are needed to explain the data. In the
following, we focus on the two interactions with Perspective.
Figure 2a illustrates the significant Perspective 6 Subject
interaction (self vs. other; x2(1, N= 114) = 12.9, p,0.01), with
participants in the first-person perspective more likely to take
pictures of themselves (62%) rather than pictures of other people
(38%); whereas, in the third-person perspective, participants were
more likely to take pictures of other people (71%) rather than
pictures of themselves (29%).
Figure 2b illustrates a significant Perspective 6 Eye Direction
interaction (x2(2, N= 114) = 10.4, p,0.01). There are two notewor-
thy aspects to this interaction. One is that first-and third-person
perspectives differed greatly in terms of the percentage of pictures
taken with the eyes of the subject hidden (59% vs. 7%,
respectively) reflecting the fact that participants in the first-person
perspective condition often took pictures of their own bodies that
did not involve their eyes being visible. For example, participants
often took pictures of one’s own foot or arm from the vantage
point of their own eyes to represent a first-person perspective.
Second, when the eyes of the person in the photos were visible, in
the first-person perspective condition, participants tended to take
pictures of people looking toward the camera (26%) rather than
away from the camera (15%); whereas, in the third-person
perspective, participants tended to take pictures of people looking
away from the camera (82%) rather than toward the camera
(11%). Finally, it is noteworthy that distance was not significant
factor for pictures with people, which stands in contrast to those
photos taken without people and described above. Examples of
photos representing the reported interactions are shown in
Figure 2c.
Picture-sorting Task
In the above unrestricted picture-taking task, three factors,
initially abstracted from the subjective reports, were found to be
critical to perspective: viewing distance, subject (self/other), and
eye-direction (toward camera/away/hidden). To assess the
validity of these factors, we tested whether they could accurately
predict performance in a controlled, laboratory-based picture-
ordering task. Each picture used in the ordering task were given a
+1 score for each first-person factor they contained and a21 score
for each third-person factor they contained, yielding an experi-
mental prediction of each picture’s perspective content. For our
limited set of 14 photos, pictures could receive a score ranging
from +3 to –3.
As shown in Figures 3a and 3b, the factors that we obtained
from the uncontrolled picture-taking task served as excellent
predictors of participants controlled photo ordering performance,
thereby validating the method and factors produced by the
subjective reports from the picture-taking task. Figure 3a shows the
predicted and observed rank-order based on a first-person
perspective and Figure 3b shows the predicted and observed
rank-order based on a third-person perspective. Note that there is
an excellent correspondence between predicted and observed
performance for both perspectives, and that the two perspectives
appear to be almost mirror functions of one another. These
impressions were confirmed statistically, with a correlation analysis
of the predicted and observed performance yielding highly
significant effects both for the first-person perspective condition,
r= .95, p,.001, and the third-person perspective condition,
r= .94, p,.001.
Discussion
The primary goal of the present investigation was to provide a
test of the cognitive ethology approach. The unrestricted picture-
taking task coupled with subjective reports provided a way to
ground the psychological concepts of first-person and third-person
perspective in how people understand them in a natural context.
Using these data that were collected without experimental control
we then generated predictions of human behavior that were tested
subsequently in a lab-based picture-ordering task. The lab-based
performance in the picture-ordering task conformed to the
predictions we derived from our uncontrolled real-world observa-
tions and subjective reports. Collectively, the two stages of our
investigation provide a proof of concept for the cognitive ethology
approach. Grounding the understanding of perspective in how it is
conceptualized in a more natural everyday context revealed that
whether a given image was understood as more representative of a
first- or third-person perspective depended on both physical (e.g.
viewing distance) and social factors (e.g. subject of image, eye-
contact). Below we highlight these findings and discuss how they
are consistent with previous lab-based conceptualizations yet also
reveal a factor that presents a novel contribution to the traditional
understanding of perspective taking.
Our results revealed that whether someone was present in the
picture or not formed the basis for two broad categories. We found
that for pictures without people, distance was the critical factor
used to depict first- and third-person perspectives, with photos
taken close-up to objects representing a first-person perspective
and those taken further away depicting a third-person perspective.
This emphasis on viewing distance is consistent with the traditional
Nigro and Neisser [39] idea that events recalled from one’s own
eyes (i.e. first-person perspective) are thought to have access to
more proximal scene representations. This finding also appears to
connect with the literature on perspective taking when recalling
emotional events. For example, whereas first-person memories
tend to contain more references to emotions (e.g., [40], [49]),
people tend to adopt a third-person perspective when recalling
events that were traumatic [50], physically painful [51], or
anxiety-provoking (e.g. [52–54]), as it allows for a degree of
detachment (i.e. emotional distance) from the negative emotions
associated with the recalled events.
In contrast to pictures that have no people present, when
pictures contained other people, distance was not a critical factor.
Instead the subject within the scene and eye gaze direction
emerged as key factors for representing first- and third-person
perspective. Many participants took a picture of a portion of their
own body to represent first-person perspective. The agency
implied by pictures of one’s own body (especially arms and hands)
is consistent with Ruby and Decety’s [41] conceptualization,
which emphasizes physical agency and imagined motor move-
ments. In addition, these images are also consistent with the
investigations that represented a first-person perspective with
videos taken from the participants’ perspective (i.e., head-centered
perspective, [44–46]).
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When the participant themselves were not present in the scene,
much weight was given to the eyes of the people photographed. If
the eyes of those photographed were visible, first- or third-person
perspective was determined by gaze direction: in a first-person
perspective gaze is directed straight at the participant (camera),
and in a third-person perspective gaze is directed away. This
finding is novel as, to the best of our knowledge, no previous
investigation of perspective taking has considered eye gaze as an
important factor. We feel that isolating this social factor is
especially important in that the subjective reports of many
participants reflected a desire to represent a sense of being
involved (first-person) or removed (third-person) from the scene
they were depicting. Most notably, participants reported social
involvement, captured by direct eye gaze, and social detachment,
represented by a lack of attention to the camera by the person in
the picture, as being most critical to representing this factor of
social engagement. This factor is also reflected in the picture-
ordering task. That is, pictures depicting groups of people whose
attention was clearly not focused toward the camera were
characterized as being predominantly third-person. However, it
is worth remembering that our present instantiation of the
cognitive ethology approach is not without limitations. For
example, the present investigation was drawn from a primarily
Western population, thus there exists the potential that this effect is
culture-specific. Similarly we still need to apply a cognitive
ethology approach with additional measurements (e.g., motion,
action, sound) to examine what role other factors play in first- vs.
third-person perspective.
Summary and Conclusion
We have found in the present study that the application of the
cognitive ethology approach can simplify and ground complex and
sometimes disparate cognitive topics firmly in everyday life, while
rendering the issues tractable to laboratory investigation. In the
present study we did not preselect the stimuli that we thought
would reflect first- and third-person perspective, but rather freed
participants to determine those stimuli for themselves in a natural
setting. Despite the uncontrolled nature of the task we found that
participants gravitated toward a shared understanding of perspec-
tive that was robust and reliable and which was defined
independent of the researchers’ own understanding. When we
selected the images for the picture-sorting study we based our
stimulus selection on this everyday conceptualization of perspec-
tives, and were able to accurately predict how people performed
on the task. The factors identified as important to the
understanding of first- and third-person perspectives were
consistent with conceptualizations used in previous work. Thus
our results suggest that previous lab-based definitions of first- and
third-person perspectives make contact with aspects of how the
concepts are understood in everyday settings. Interestingly, our
results did, however, reveal a novel social factor not included in
traditional conceptualizations of perspective – eye gaze. The
present investigation thus highlights the utility of the cognitive
ethology approach, when employed in its entirety, to bridge the
gap between life and lab.
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